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City of Louisville v. The Women's Club of
Louisville
CARSON P. PORTER*
In 1973, the City of Louisville created the Landmarks Com-
mission under an ordinance modeled after the New York City
ordinance.1 Mayor Harvey Sloan, who was dedicated to the
cause of preservation, had appointed me to be General Counsel
of the Landmarks Commission. In that office, I became em-
broiled in the first test case of the Louisville ordinance. There
were many problems, but with the help of Frank Gilbert and
others at the National Trust for Historic Preservation, we have
weathered the storm. I will tell you about one of our problems.
In 1973, the Women's Club of Louisville, which owned an
absolutely gorgeous old building and two Victorian houses adja-
cent to that building, petitioned the newly created Landmarks
Commission for approval to demolish those houses and replace
them with a "parking garden." Once this petition had been filed,
it became incumbent upon me, the new General Counsel to this
new organization, to determine whether the Commission had the
authority to stop the Club from demolishing the houses. It did
not. It had the authority to negotiate with the Club, and there-
fore, we entered into negotiations - unproductive negotiations
that lasted nine months. At that point, the Mayor, concerned
citizens, members of the Commission and I petitioned our Board
of Aldermen to take a significant step. We asked Louisville's
governing body to file a lawsuit utilizing its constitutional au-
thority of eminent domain to condemn and acquire these two
houses in order to preserve them and to prevent their demoli-
tion. In Kentucky, that was a unique proposal. Generally, con-
demnation is used in Kentucky only to destroy things and to
replace them with the likes of parking lots. In this case, we were
trying to reverse that trend by proposing to use condemnation to
preserve; in the process we were up against one of the most ver-
erable organizations in our community, a club totally dedicated
to public service.
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The Board of Aldermen wisely and unanimously approved
the filing of that lawsuit. Litigation commenced on March 4,
1975. The saga of this litigation is divided into three parts. We
lost the first part, the skirmish. Counsel for the Women's Club
contended that there was no constitutional authority to con-
demn in order to preserve. We felt somewhat comfortable in
that three decisions of the United States Supreme Court with a
total ruling of 27 to 0, happened to be in our favor. Judge
Thomas A. Ballantine of Jefferson Circuit Court, however, ig-
nored those decisions and ruled in favor of the Club. Nonethe-
less, we had obtained a temporary restraining order, paving the
way for an injunction. Judge Ballantine did continue the injunc-
tion throughout the appeal and throughout any further litigation
because, after all, if the Club had demolished the houses, our
appeal would have been moot.
We won the second part. Although it took about a year, we
finally received a determination from the Kentucky Supreme
Court that they did not know whether it was permissible to con-
demn for historic preservation, and in fact, they did not really
care. The case, as it was presented to that court, had nothing to
do with constitutional authority to condemn for preservation
purposes because, as we had argued, the historic preservation or-
dinance had no relevance to the exercise of condemnation au-
thority. Once we had left the forum of the administrative agency
and transferred to the forum of our legislative body, the latter
had absolute authority, as clearly expressed in the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, to condemn anything for a
public purpose, as long as they did not defraud people in exer-
cising that power (there was no such allegation in this case) and
as long as they paid just compensation for the property as deter-
mined by a trial court.2 The Supreme Court of Kentucky wisely
and unanimously agreed with that argument. Like the United
States Supreme Court, they prefer to sidestep a constitutional
issue whenever possible, so they decided this case exclusively on
the basis of jurisdiction. As far as the constitutional issue is con-
cerned, our saga has little implication for potential litigation
outside Kentucky.
The third part was a tie. When we returned to our circuit
court, we tried the case as to value. The plaintiff, the City of
Louisville, had the burden of proving how much the houses were
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worth. We called two expert witnesses, who testified that these
houses were only worth $100,000 because of the neglect of the
owners, the Women's Club, during the three or four years of ne-
gotiation and litigation. The Women's Club, though, brought in
three appraisers who said that the houses were grand examples
of Richardsonian Roman National Architecture, which they are,
and who contended that the property was worth $250,000. The
panel awarded $175,000, the midpoint between the two apprais-
als. The City of Louisville paid the award and obtained title to
the property. We are now trying to renovate these two homes,
prime examples of Victorian architecture of which the City of
Louisville is very proud.
Many localities are reluctant to condemn because of the
high cost of acquisition. It may help if I tell you how we raised
the money. Most of it came from the municipal treasury, the
rest from private donations. Mayor Sloan was being criticized by
people who were opposed to allocating public funds for preserva-
tion of these two houses when the City faced potential strikes by
the police and firemen for pay raises. He told me that either we
had to back out of the litigation or we had to plumb the depths
of the commitment of the people who had encouraged the litiga-
tion. He asked me to raise $30,000 as a demonstration of broad
community support for preservation. Within seven days, we
raised $35,000. We called meetings of preservation supporters
and talked with them about how a government had gone out on
a limb for them, and it was time for them to climb the tree and
get out there too. Government is a two-way street. If the citizens
did not participate in it, and give it their commitment, and this
time it meant some dollars, then they couldn't expect to have all
their concerns continually addressed by local government. Once
we raised the $35,000, we deposited it with the court as evidence
of good faith, and there was never another word from anyone in
state or local government about spending the other $140,000
when the jury verdict came in.
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